The basic stats are simple. The religious have more children than the non-religious. Although more people convert from religion into non-religion, conversion probably won't be enough to tip the balance. As a result, the religious will make up an increasingly large proportion of the population as the century progresses.
Why should this be a problem? After all, most religious people are inoffensive, liberal types who are good neighbours. They surely don't pose a threat to liberal society.
But the problem comes when you dig into the details - especially when you separate out the devoutly religious (fundamentalists, born again Christians, cultists etc) from the mainstream religious.
Because the major fertility fault line is not between the religious and atheists, but between the mainstream religious (and atheists) and the fanatics.
In modern America fertility rates among the mainstream religious, although a little higher than among the non-religious, are pretty low. Kaufmann shows that, regardless of faith, fertility rates among the religious have declined throughout the 20th century, tracking (although always slightly higher) those of the non-religious.
Today, the fertility rate for liberal protestants in the USA stands at 1.84 children per woman (p90), while that of moderate protestants is 2.01 and conservative protestants has fallen to only 2.13. Mormon fertility rates, although consistently higher, have on average tracked those of the US population at large.
And it's not just Christians that are seeing fertility rates drop. In 1981, Muslims in Austria had a fertility rate of 3.09 (p172). Twenty years later, that had dropped to 2.34 (still well above the fertility rate of the natives, however).
In other words, this is good old-fashioned conservatism. Liberals have lead the way, with female emancipation causing the 'Second Demographic Transition' to small family sizes. Conservatives have come on board more slowly, but young conservatives are adopting the values of the liberals of a generation ago.
But these average statistics conceal an ugly reality. Because while fertility rates among the 'normal' religious are dropping, those among the hardliners are staying high or even increasing.
The most dramatic examples given by include the ultra-orthodox Jews, ultra conservative cults like the Amish (who have increased from 5,000 to 250,000 in the past century), the 'Quiverful' fundamentalists, and pentecostals in Finland. In all cases, these groups are characterised by isolationism and high birth rates. Their new recruits are born, not made.
There seems to be two reasons why this happens. Firstly, these ultra-conservatives have remained highly patriarchal.
'Normal' conservative Christianity places a high value on conversions. While this increases their numbers, it also means that their members and values are influenced by those in the wider world.
Not so the patriarchal cults. Cut off from influence from the outside world, women remain relegated to their traditional roles. With restricted access to education, and little opportunity for independence or escape, they become, in practice, children factories.
The statistics demonstrate the power of these cults in enforcing traditional values and preventing female emancipation. The Mennonites, who are Anabaptists like the Amish but who speak English at home and accept intermarriage and modern technology, have average fertility rates. And while the most conservative old-Amish retain 95% of their children, the slightly more liberal new order Amish retain only 57% (p36).
But there is more to the story than female subjugation. Because these cults actively and consciously promote fertility as a way to increase their power.
In other words, they recognize that conversion has failed as a strategy to promulgate religion. So the fundamentalists have retreated from conversion, turn in upon themselves, and intend to achieve victory through remorseless demographics.
In Israel and Palestine, both orthodox Jews and religious Muslims have astonishingly high birth rates, at least in part as a consequence of waging war 'by other means'. Throughout the Islamic world, those who have the most extreme beliefs are also the most likely to endorse the desirability of large families.
And, back in the USA, the leaders of the half-crazed "Quiverful" cult fantasise about their future armies of "mini-me's". Geoffrey Botkin, one of the architects of the movement, even:
...produced a spreadsheet which predicts that he will be the patriarch of 186,000 male descendants within two centuries. At the birth of his latest addition, Anna Sofia, Botkin passed his hand over the abdomen of the sleeping newborn, praying for her to be the 'future mother of tens of millions'. (p95)
These religious cults are a lethal combination of female subjugation and male power fantasies. And that's what makes them dangerous to all liberals - both religious and non-religious.
So what should be the appropriate liberal response? Well, Kaufmann does not say. Although he holds out hope that moderate religion, with its feel-good fuzzies, may somehow triumph over the hardliners, he recognizes that action is needed:
It will be a century or more before the world completes its demographic transition. There is still too much smoke in the air for us to pick out the peaks and valleys of the emerging social order. This much seems certain: without an ideology to inspire social cohesion, fundamentalism cannot be stopped. The religious shall inherit the earth.
I, for one, see hope for a liberal, secular future, despite these grim statistics.
We can start by recognizing that some liberal values hold within them the seeds of their own destruction. For the cults to survive, they need to isolate their children from external influence. They do this in a number of ways, especially by physical isolation - home schooling, restrict access to alternative world views, separate schools, and even (in the case of the Mormons) separate universities.
This can only happen when children are regarded as the property of their parents, rather than as individuals with rights of their own to an open, diverse education and interaction with the wider world. Liberals need to weigh carefully these two rights to ensure that liberal values do not empower most those who seek to destroy them..
What's more, these cults thrive upon fear of outsiders. Both Muslim and Christian fundamentalists play upon fears that their culture will be overwhelmed by secularists. Atheists need to think hard about how they engage with the religious, since ratcheting up the level of conflict serves to paradoxically increase the power of the religious patriarchs.
Furthermore, part of the reason birth rates have fallen with female emancipation is that, all too often, women are forced to choice between an independent career and a family. Signs are that this is already changing.
Men are devoting more time to child care than ever before. In Europe, fertility rates are actually highest in the least religious countries. If liberals can create a society in which women can couple a secure, independent existence with children, then fertility rates may yet rebound.
And lastly, I wonder about the future of liberal fertility. It's true that liberal fertility rates are continuing to fall. But liberal values, like fundamentalist ones, are inherited as well as communicated.
Many liberals do have children. They have found a solution that balances liberal values, modern society, and family. And since they are still in the vast majority, it is their values (and genes), that will make up the overwhelming majority of future generations.
Maybe, just maybe, it will be these liberals that shall inherit the earth!
This article by Tom Rees was first published on Epiphenom. It is licensed under Creative Commons.
My response to this got so long that it went over the 4k character limit, so I turned it into an entire blog post.
ReplyDeleteIn a nutshell: I suspect the trend may be self-limiting, since insularity is difficult to maintain on a large scale -- but on the other hand, the Internet may allow groups like Quiverfull to operate a "cell"-like structure that would get around the problem of combining large numbers with insularity. My primary hope rests in the fact that fundamentalist values can usually only be maintained in a state of perpetual ignorance, and that the pace of information flow will make this enforced ignorance less practical in the future.
Let's hope James is correct, and I can concur about some of the mechanisms...in theory. On the other hand, I've been privy to Kaufmann's analyses for some time, and his assessments are firmly grounded in empirical reality (damn it). We've seen this happen time and again in many nations, Iran being the most obvious case---fundamentalist nutjobs from the hinterland outbreed everyone else and then take over. Arguably, the same thing happened in the USA in the latter half of the 20th century. Beyond education and trying to reorient religious fundamentalists, I was thinking it may be good to mandate contraception....maybe put something in the water...
ReplyDeleteThank you for that review, Tom. Having studied fertility effects on religion for a long time (you posted about that, thanx), I was struck by the strong predictions concerning short-term developments, e.g. in Israel.
ReplyDeleteFrom an evolutionary perspective, the intergenerational fertility potential of religiosity is a very strong indicator of adaptiveness. Up to now, we do have lots of case studies of high-fertile religious communities, but found not a single secular tradition attaining more than two births per woman for just two or three generations. As to our present knowledge, secular populations don't pass their genes successfully...
Now here's where you lost me. You stated:
ReplyDeleteThe religious have more children than the non-religious. Although more people convert from religion into non-religion, conversion probably won't be enough to tip the balance.
The underlying assumption appears to be that there in fact exists a genetic disposition towards religiosity.
But if that were so, why would the radical fundamentalists place such a high value on indoctrination and go to considerable lengths, as you described, to render their young unfit for life outside the community they were born into, by denying them education and shielding them from mainstream ideas?
If the religiosity of their offspring in fact were coded in the genes they passed on to them, these measures, which consume a lot of the community's time and resources, would not be necessary.
The intense mistrust that such cults tend to harbour against the influence of the outside world seems to indicate that they themselves do not subscribe to the notion that their disposition towards a rigid religious belief system will be passed on reliably.
This is a point that completely eludes me.
Michael... so where did all the non-religious comes from? I mean, we've been culturally modern for 30,000 years (1,500 generations), and we're less religious that ever before.
ReplyDeleteThe point is that these data are from the modern 'ecosystem'. These conditions didn't apply in our evolutionary past. Religion may well have been adaptive in some way in the past, but these data do not show it.
And anyway, even if it was it clearly wasn't a slam dunk - most modern people will quite happily be non-religious, if you bring them up ion the appropriate environment.
Michael K: I do agree. Although there are psychological traits that contribute to different aspects of religion, they don't code 'for' religion. They code for behaviours that could be religious or non-religious, in the appropriate cultural background.
ReplyDeleteBut the reality is that most people aren't exposed to competing worldviews. Although some people switch, mostly religion (and non-religion) is inherited - culturally, if not genetically. The switch rates into non-religion are not high enough to make up for the differences in birth rates.
That's especially the case for fundamentalists, who take active steps to shut their kids away from outside influence.
Tom, you did a sound study yourself showing the answer: When people are well-off, extrinsic motivations to participate in religious communities is waning, secularization is taking place, quickly leading into demographic dead ends. Only the intrinsically motivated are retaining (or finding) their faiths - passing on their genetic and cultural traditions. It's a fully natural, evolutionary process, comparable e.g. to those that brought about musicality.
ReplyDeleteMichael, I was talking about our evolutionary past. These data don't support the argument that religion was adaptive in the past (since everybody had lots of children in the past).
ReplyDeleteGoing forwards it's a different matter. In the current environment, in which survival is more or less guaranteed, genes that improve survival (by, for example, ensuring that beliefs are anchored in reality) are not selected for.
All that matters in the current environment is having lots of children, since they will all survive.
Now, some people have lots of children, and of course their genes overrepresented in subsequent generations. This isn't evolution per se, because evolution requires selection - but virtually everyone lives to reproductive age.
Nevertheless, those people who have the characteristic "give birth to as many children as possible" will increase the frequency of their genes in the gene pool. To the extent that this characteristic is genetically encoded (it may not be), then those genes will become relatively more frequent.
If these genes are also linked to some aspect of religion, then that aspect of religion may also become more frequent.
However, I think that link is unlikely. That's because religious liberals have a birth rate similar to non-religious liberals.
The common characteristic of the 'highly fertile' groups is that they are inward looking, highly conservative, and reject outsiders (out-group negativity).
It's these characteristics that I think will become increasingly common. They are linked to religion, but the main reason for that is that religion provides a binding ideology with historical authority - exactly what conservatives of this kind are looking for.
But religion itself is not the cause - the Nazis were also highly pro-natal, as were other fascists. It's a characteristic of this kind of mentality (very high emphasis on the group above personal needs).
Tom, I did a lot of texts on these subjects in German, but I promise I will proceed to do some more in English (as papers and in the blog), too.
ReplyDeleteJust three arguments: Genetic heritability has been shown in Twin studies.
http://www.scilogs.eu/en/blog/biology-of-religion/2009-05-21/religiosity-partly-inherited-by-genes
And I think it would be a real surprise if religiosity didn't have biological foundations as any other trait, wouldn't it?
Hunters and gatherers influence the numbers of their children, as well as showing different degrees of religiosity and their religious traditions are pro-natal.
And, no, the Nazis didn't manage to attain high fertile rates. As the birth rates of the SS officers dropped to 1.4, Himmler even started the desperate "Lebensborn" project.
We still don't know of a single secular community which retained replacement level, neither nationalist, nor socialist, nor liberal - Eric is right with that one.
Michael, yes for sure religion is partly inherited, but not in a simple way. Religion is a mix of many different things - just look at the arguments that start when anyone tries to define it. It's not a continuum from non-religious to religious. The more I study it, the more I come to think in particular that fundamentalist religion is quite a different beast to liberal religion.
ReplyDeleteSo 'religion' is not inherited, but rather there are a number of inherited traits which, in the right cultural settings, predispose to something we in the West label 'religion'.
In other cultural settings, these same traits could predispose to other cultural beliefs and practices. That's why I brought up the Nazis. Fascism (and communism) are not religions, but they share some characteristics with some forms of religion. The same genetic trait might make a fascist in early 20th century Europe, or a 'Quiverful' member in early 21st century USA.
Re Nazi pronatalism. Well, you see, those Nazis that did not have many children were not true Nazis :) More seriously, there was a war on, which has bad effects on birth rates, and averages obscure the specifics. Few Nazis responded to the call, but then few religious people take seriously that they should reproduce like mad for the good of the cause. Those that do, however, will pass on multiple copies of their genes...
Tom, I am repeatedly astonished about the global myths perpetuated about the Nazis. I may assure you as a German: They didn't manage to raise their fertility rates t large, siding with the (sometimes longer-lived) Nationalist movements in Italia, Spain etc. which failed on the same task. The same happened to secular-socialist regimes, even if these were extremely pro-natalist (as e.g. in Romania). If you would like to convince me that any secular movement could raise the fertility of adherents as those of many religious, you just would have to name a single example of a secular movement, party, community (etc.) able to retain birth rates above replacement levels among its adherents for just two or three subsequent generations (as did many religious groups, e.g. in the US). As to now, we found none, not a single one.
ReplyDeleteAnd, yes, there is no easy inheritance nor definition of "religion" - and the same is true of "music". What is inherited are the biological foundations, that is musicality and religiosity. And the latter has been defined as belief in supernatural agents (as early as with Charles Darwin himself, who rightfully assumed it to be adaptive). I did a German lecture and chapter about the matter on the cue of a German geneticist, but didn't manage to translate the text into English yet:
http://www.blume-religionswissenschaft.de/pdf/WarumnochAtheistenBlume2009.pdf
Although I would agree that there are loads of open questions, I don't see a single convincing argument why we should assume that religiosity should be transmitted differently than any other biocultural trait as e.g. musicality or intelligence. And as some religious tend to have more children while the seculars are falling below replacement levels, evolution is obviously still going on.
Tom Rees wrote:
ReplyDeleteThat's especially the case for fundamentalists, who take active steps to shut their kids away from outside influence.
Right. My point is that they do this for a reason, or a combination of reasons.
I assume that one reason is that they fear the exposure to lifestyles and ideas contrary to their own ideology's tenets and that another, perhaps the most important one, is the wish to make their group members unfit for life outside the community. This will strongly limit the individual members' willingness or ability to leave.
The question is not only why they see these measures as necessary.
Perhaps more importantly, the question is whether acting in this way isn't the sociological equivalent of the proverbial act painting oneself into a corner.
For sure, what they are doing means that their numbers will rise - for a time. But don't these groups effectively limit them selves to defined, secluded niches of society?
Can they continue to function and maintain their integrity if their numbers rise to the point where they can no longer be contained in these niches?
I suspect that they can't - they must inevitably reach a point where their sheer numbers preclude application of the strict control that was instrumental to their initial high growth rates.
If my conjecture is right, at a certain point the groups will either cease to grow, or they will break apart, or they will start fraying at the edges until they are absorbed in the mainstream.
@Michael Khan, I completely agree with you on that one!
ReplyDeleteIn fact, growing fundamentalist groups are changing the very environment they are living in - and thus have to adapt. Normally, they will begin to break apart into conservative, moderate and liberal wings.
We have seen that repeatedly in the US, e.g. with the Methodists, then the Baptists, currently the Pentecostals. Given political stability and freedom, the overall picture is that of a cultural wave function, with the religious reorganizing into new forms after each period of secularization, then peaking, breaking apart etc...
For a graph on this topic, see e.g.
http://www.chronologs.de/chrono/blog/natur-des-glaubens/grundlagen/2009-10-22/warum-gibt-es-noch-atheisten
If conversion rates (to mainstream religion) increase as the proportion of fundamentalists goes up, then yes, it will be self limiting. It could happen - only time will tell. But there are a couple of things to bear in mind.
ReplyDeleteFirstly is that ultra-orthodox jews have increased from a vanishingly small minority to a very large group, and their growth shows no sign of slowing. The same goes for the Amish.
Secondly, the people who switch out are different from the ones who stay in. The ones who stay in are likely to have a personality that values closed-minded, in-group mentality, rejecting diversity even when offered.
Now this raises a very interesting vision for the future. Remember that the 'mainstream' fundamentalists have lower birth rates that the conservatives. What this means is that the people who have a personality that is not 'open to experience' will have the highest fertility rates.
In other words, it's ultra-conservatism that is the cause of the high fertility, and this is the trait that will predominate.
And this comes back to what I was saying earlier. It's not 'religion' that leads to higher fertility. It's a particular trait. I think that one of those traits is close-mindedness.
I think another is willingness to sacrifice individual needs in order to promote your group over others (this comes through strongly in Quiverfull and islamic fundamentalists, but also in commentators like Rabbi Sacks). This is the link to fascism I was talking about earlier. Same motives different contexts. (Michael B: the fact that fascist governments failed isn't the point. The religious government in Iran has also failed in this respect. I'm talking about individual personality traits).
Michael B: in addition, you can argue that belief in the supernatural is essential for religion (in which case Buddhism isn't a religion), but it is not sufficient. Many people believe in the supernatural witthout having any of the other trappings of religion. More importantly, from the perspective of religion, these liberal, open minded people don't have high fertility (nor do liberal christians)
ReplyDeleteSo whatever is causing the high fertility, it isn't supernatural belief per se (although that may interact with and reinforce other factors - two of which I touched on in my previous comment).
Tom, you know the data from the Swiss census (you reviewed my respective article on your blog) - even most liberal and moderate religious communities do have higher fertility than the non-denominational. And you know the respective studies e.g. of Richard Sosis, comparing religious and secular groups in the US or religious and secular kibbutzim in Israel. Religious groups "can" falter demographically, but secular groups "cannot" expand - we didn't find any. Not a secular regime, not a party, not a movement, neither nationalist nor socialist or humanist...
ReplyDeleteBuddhism is a very good point, indeed: Originally, it is more of a philosophy, rejecting the existence of supernatural agents. But in historical reality, it evolved into a religious system, with folk buddhism venerating all kinds of gods, bodhisatvas, the Buddha himself etc.
If secular traditions could succeed demographically (and thus, in biocultural evolution), it should be easy to find at least some of them. But there are none and even outright experiments (as the named parties, kibbutzim etc.) failed.
Looking forward to your upcoming posts!
Yours, Michael
Michael, that's generally true (although Kaufman's data are somewhat different). But Kaufman's point, and one that I touch in in my blog post, is that the trajectories of moderate religious and fundamentalists are quite different.
ReplyDeleteThe reason for low birth rates is the novel social arrangement whereby women are allowed to work for their own independent social status. That means less time for child rearing.
Now religious people are conservative. But 'conservative' simply means clining on to 'traditional' values, and what's traditional changes from generation to generation. You can see that from Scandinavian conservatives, who stridently protect their traditional values of female emancipation against 'outsiders'.
So, for those religious who interact with the outside world, what it means to be 'traditional' changes.
As both you and Michael have pointed out, the effect of this is that religions with a tradition of proselytisation and interaction with the outside world, like protestant evangelism, come to adopt the values of liberals of previous years.
If that were so, and the high birth rates of the religious were just due to a relatively slow uptake of female emancipation due to their conservative nature, then you would expect that their birth rates would drop in the same way as the non-religious, but with a time lag - of about 1 generation. And that, according to Kaufmann, is exactly what you do see. At any given time, the religious have birth rates higher than the non-religious, but lower than their parents. It's simply because they're conservative, and so slow to adopt new values.
What will happen to these religious traditions is unclear, but I would guess that the birth rates of nonreligious and mainstream religious will converge, since their values (with regard to female liberation, as well as with regard to social structure to support the status-motivation of mothers) will come to be similar.
But the ultraconservatives are a different matter. They don't try to proselytise, and that, perversely, is the source of their demographic potential. Cut off from outside influence, women remain in their traditional role, and they resist very well the penetration of liberal values.
For these groups, I see no reason that their birth rates shouldn't stay at their current very high rates. Which means they'll have an enormous fertility advantage over both non-religious and mainstream religious.
Michael Kahn said "I suspect that they can't - they must inevitably reach a point where their sheer numbers preclude application of the strict control that was instrumental to their initial high growth rates.
ReplyDeleteIf my conjecture is right, at a certain point the groups will either cease to grow, or they will break apart, or they will start fraying at the edges until they are absorbed in the mainstream."
I hope you're right, but I could see another, more dangerous, scenario. In current US politics, ultra-conservatives who vote have been persuaded to vote in the interests of big-time mammon. Mammon has responded with serious funding for evangelism, financed by tax deductions (that we irreligious types make up for on our taxes). With a scalable subsidy for their "alternative lifestyle", is there really any limit to how many ultra-fundamentalists a rich country can sustain in isolation? Oil sheikdoms are likewise funding extremist madrassas to gain a constituency for their monarchies. Fundamentalist enclaves need not be self-supporting.
Though fundamentalism may be spread as if it were genetic (with perhaps some losses due to outside cultural influence), it still need not take over the earth. I can see two simple mechanisms that would help.
ReplyDeleteFirst, we need to make sure that a "quiverful" of young minds are exposed to each educated teacher, as was the case in the 1950s that conservatives so love. Home "schooling" is illegal in many countries, and there is no justification for it in any area with sufficient population density to have a public school. If "no child left behind" were to be taken at face value, this would happen by default, and break the pseudo-genetic pattern.
If we fail to educate all children, there's the second option: fighting pseudo-genetics with natural selection. We have assumed that there is no survival disadvantage in being fundamentalist, but that need not be so. Reminding fundies of the role of evolutionary theory in designing and re-designing antibacterial and antiviral drugs - perhaps even requiring them to sign documents acknowledging *current* evolution - would make many eschew either fundamentalism or modern treatment. Garry Trudeau's cartoon suggests this in a humorous way (http://stupidevilbastard.com/2006/01/doonesbury_takes_on_creationism/).
Rick - yes, I agree. When chilren are exposed to a range of worldviews, then they tend not to choose the dogmatic ones. The challenge is how to accomplish this in a society that allows home education and puts a high value on parental choice (i.e. viewing children as the property of their parents, rather than as individuals with socially-guaranteed rights).
ReplyDeleteTom, I agree that we need a national discussion on the rights of children. The international community already has had some of this discussion, and resolved it in favor of the child (Wikipedia says the UNCRC has been adopted by every country but the US and Somalia, but that Somalia will do so shortly). While the UNCRC doesn't directly address the right to education, opposition to childrens' other rights seems to go hand-in-hand with suppressing education. Similar patterns can be seen for womens' rights.
ReplyDeleteIt seems that today, it's only in the US is anti-intellectualism considered respectably conservative. Conservative tradition in Europe asserts the state's right (and, in the case of France, at least, the responsibility) to educate children adequately. Historically, this probably derives from the Catholic church's prior claim of the same right. Sadly, the US now is more like Saudi Arabia than Europe, with anti-intellectual cults being a key constituency for political success. Their political clout, plus the threat of tax-deduction-supported lawsuits, apparently has made the educational system chicken out of its responsibilities to kids. Shame on us.
i see that argument a lot...but I think they underestimate the population of skeptics, and non fundamentalists believers and the deconversion rate, especially in a information based society. Also deconversions are more likely in populated areas, implying that the more people there are the more likely interactions will occur that indicate blind faith is not rational, which shows that their strength might also be a weakness. I am actually glad that educated individuals have less children because it offers a simple solution for curbing overpopulation. The last fifty years have shown remarkable progress towards reason and people aren't pumping out babies any faster. I guess I'm optimistic so long as free flow of information can be maintained. fundies tend to help deconvert people with their antics, so it could very well be a high tide or last gasp scenario going on
ReplyDeleteJosiah, I tend to agree with you. What we are observing in all free societies are parallel forces of secularization taking place at the one side and higher fertility rates of the religious on the other. Thus, we are having ups and downs (like economic cycles) and religious pluralization, but no decisive victory on either side.
ReplyDeleteI just posted US-data on fertility and transition rates here:
http://www.scilogs.eu/en/blog/biology-of-religion/2010-06-03/religions-and-fertility-in-the-us-gss-data
And I would like to emphasize that Tom was among those who discussed the topic early on!
http://epiphenom.fieldofscience.com/2009/09/why-do-atheists-have-fewer-kids.html
Damn. James, Michael, Michael, Tom, Rick, Josiah.
ReplyDeleteThe existential fear of men who realize that they no longer control the means of reproduction-- that women are now free to use or not use their uteri when they please.
Apparently, this sparks existential angst-ridden debate among testosterone carriers about whether or not the sky is falling.
I know a lot of you were standing up to liberalism and freedom. But I really just couldn't finish reading this comment thread, because the subtext of fear at the loss of control over women in secular society was just too high. (either the comment about contraception in the water or implying that we would have to go back to religious patriarchalism in order for society to last more than three generations)
I'm sorry you didn't get dealt a baby factory at birth, as I do think mine's quite nifty. But don't get so bent out of shape about it! We're not going to extinctify the entire planet, at least... not by having *too few* children! lol
signed,
the first female commenter?
@jemand, thanks for the wonderful comment! :-)
ReplyDeleteIn fact, I am a happy husband and father and neither fearful nor in need of a baby factory. ;-)
In fact, my studies are centered about women and men doing (religious and familial) choices, with the data indicating a formational role of human females. See the data here, page 123 f.!
http://www.blume-religionswissenschaft.de/pdf/ReproductiveReligiosityBlume2009.pdf
And I would FULLY agree that there is a problem about men dominating evolutionary discussions! I wrote about that one here, too:
http://www.scilogs.eu/en/blog/biology-of-religion/2010-01-21/humans-are-cooperative-breeders-evolving-religion-sarah-hrdy
So, please join the fray, @jemand!
I've often wondered whether rational thinking and careful family planning was going to eventually get bred out of us by irresponsible teen sluts and rabbit religions, to the point where I began to contemplate whether it was unethical for me not to contribute what I've got to the gene pool. Of course, I also have a history of ADD, MS, and heart problems...
ReplyDeleteI think that's something people should think about--whether their kid and the gene pool are going to be better or worse for their contribution; if maybe they should just adopt a kid who's already in this world and needs their love.
As for the cults, they'll just fall apart once they get too big...
The elephant in the room is the heritability of religiosity.
ReplyDeleteNow it cannot be denied that religiosity is affected by more than just genes, otherwise there would not be such a strong trend towards secularization at the present moment. But some people just seem to be incorrigibly religious. That is they are going to be religious no matter what social system they find themselves in. This would seem to be underlaid by psychological traits with a strong genetic component.
So, what our current situation seems to be selecting for people who are going to be religious no matter what. Secular people could try to more effectively pick off the children of the religious, but all that would really do in the long run is select for people who are really, really religious no matter what. If you consider an analogy, secularism is like an anti-biotic, and religious people are a form of bacteria. If secularism manages to kill off all religious people (not by actually killing them, but by making them into secular people) then it would be effective. However, if it doesn't kill off all religious people (metaphorically) then all you end up doing is creating a super-bug. Those who are innately most resistant to secularism will inherit the earth.
I pretty much see this as inevitable. It seems pretty indisputable that some people are going to be religious no matter what and psychological traits underlie that religiosity and furthermore that genes underly those psychological traits.
Secularism is doomed.
Now religious people are conservative. But 'conservative' simply means clining on to 'traditional' values, and what's traditional changes from generation to generation.
ReplyDeleteFalse, conservatism, for lack of a better word, is a moral orientation not an attitude towards change. Conservatives value purity, authority, and loyalty in addition to care and justice, while liberals and libertarians vale only the latter two.
So, if religious people are being selected for then there is probably also a selection for a morality that includes the former three moral foundations as well.
Social liberalism is doomed too.
But the ultraconservatives are a different matter. They don't try to proselytise, and that, perversely, is the source of their demographic potential. Cut off from outside influence, women remain in their traditional role, and they resist very well the penetration of liberal values.
ReplyDeleteI wonder about the arrow of causation here. In other words, are their predispositions towards conservative religion caused by their isolation, or is it their predispositions which cause them to isolate themselves?
In other words are these people who would gravitate towards isolated religious sects even if educated in public schools etc.
But if that were so, why would the radical fundamentalists place such a high value on indoctrination and go to considerable lengths, as you described, to render their young unfit for life outside the community they were born into, by denying them education and shielding them from mainstream ideas?
ReplyDeleteIf the religiosity of their offspring in fact were coded in the genes they passed on to them, these measures, which consume a lot of the community's time and resources, would not be necessary.
You're assuming a mainly functionalist mindset here. What if they just think that mainstream society or at least some products of it are impure and that contact with them defiles you?
Religion is a mix of many different things - just look at the arguments that start when anyone tries to define it. It's not a continuum from non-religious to religious.
ReplyDeleteReligion may indeed be a suite of traits, but as Tom well knows, or should know, traits that form this kind of symbiosis will then tend to be selected together.
There seems to be some kind of attempt to wiggle out of the implications here, but the logic is in fact unforgiving.